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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Amendment, one of the most essential safeguards in our Bill of Rights,
depends in large part upon what limitations the courts define and main-
tain with respect to the right of search without warrant incidental to
lawful arrest. A misunderstanding of the Harris case may lead to such
an extension of these limitations -as to necessitate a sharp reversal of
policy if the constitutional guarantee is not to be lost.
ERNEST W. MACliEN, JR.
Courts-Federal Jurisdiction-Application of Res Judicata
and Erie v. Tompkins to Achieve Uniformity of
Law Within a State
In 1940, Angel, a citizen of North Carolina, purchased of Bullfngton,
a citizen of Virginia, land situated in Virginia and gave in payment
thereof a series of notes secured by. a purchase money deed of trust.
The contract was made in Virginia, and the notes were payable in Vir-
ginia. Angel defaulted, and Bullington, acting upon an acceleration
clause, caused the trustees to sell the land. A deficiency resulted. Bul-
lington sued Angel in a North Carolina superior court to recover the
deficiency. Angel demurred to the cause of action on the basis of the
following statute:
"In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees
under powers of sale contained in any mortgage or deed of trust
executed after February 6, 1933, or where judgment or decree
is given for the foreclosure of any mortgage executed after Feb-
ruary 6, 1933, to secure the balance of the purchase price of real
property, the mortgagee or trustee or holder of the notes secured
by such mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to a de-
ficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust,
or obligation secured by the same."'
The demurrer was overruled and Angel appealed. Bullington chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the statute. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed,2 holding that the statute precluded the recovery of a
deficiency judgment arising out of purchase money deed of trust. It
said,8 "It will be noted that the limitation created by the statute is upon
the jurisdiction of the court .... This closes the courts of this State
to one whb seeks a deficiency judgment on a note given for the purchase
price of real property. The statute operates upon the adjective law of
the state, which pertains to the practice and procedure, or legal machin-
ery by which the substantive law is made effective, and not upon the
substantive law itself." It further said, in substance, that the legislature
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-36.
2 Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. 2d 411 (1941).
Id. at 20, 16 S. E. 2d at 412.
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had, within constitutional limitations, fixed the jurisdiction of the courts
of the state.
Bullington accepted the North Carolina decision at face value, and
went into the federal district court where he obtained his deficiency
judgment.4 Upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals the decision
was affirmed 5 on the ground that the state court's interpretation of the
statute was binding on the federal courts, and since the statute was
construed as procedural only, the federal court was not bound to
apply it.
Angel appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that under Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins6 the federal court erred in not applying the
statute. Bullington again questioned the constitutionality of the statute.
.The court held,7 (1) the issue of constitutionality was necessarily de-
cided by the North Carolina court and was therefore res judicata,
(2) under the Erie doctrine the courts below erred in not following the
statute and dismissing the action.
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins in overruling Swift v. Tyson8 announced
the doctrine that in diversity of citizenship cases, federal courts must
follow the rules of substantive law of the states in which they sit
whether that law is found in state statutes or the decisions of state
courts. More important than the actual doctrine of the Erie case is
the policy which dictated it, i.e., uniformity of result within a particular
state regardless of the forum, state or federal, in which suit is brought.9
Since the Erie mandate relates to substantive law as opposed to pro-
cedural law,10 it is obvious that the distinction between substance and
procedure has become increasingly important." The policy of uni-
formity has undermined the traditional distinctions. Whether a state
law will be considered substantive or procedural for purposes of the Erie
rule no longer depends upon what it, traditionally has been called nor
upon what a state court calls it, but upon what effect it will have on the
outcome of litigation. 12 Regardless of which characterization has been
placed upon them in the past, it is now settled that state rules as to
'Bullington v. Angel, 56 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. N. C. 1944).5 Angel v. Bullington, 150 F. 2d 697 (C. C. A. 4th 1945) ; Notes, 24 N. C. L.
REv. 267 (1946), 13 U. OF CHL L. REv. 195 (1946), 21 IND. L. J. 228 (1946).
304 U. S. 64 (1938).
Angel v. Bullington, - U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. 557 (1947).
S16 PYet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109 (1945) ; Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 75 (1938).
'
10 Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938) (federal courts
must search out the entire body of state substantive law).
I Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after
Erie Railroad v. Tompkihs, 34 ILL. L. RPv. 271 (1939-40).11 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109 (1945) ("1... does it [statute
of limitations] significantly affect the result of a litigation ... ?").
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burden of proof,'3 conflicts of laws,1 4 public policy,' 5 statutes of limita-
tion,1 6 and the admission of parol evidence"' must be followed by
the federal courts.' 8
The majority in the instant case said,19 "For purposes of diversity
jurisdiction a federal court is, 'in effect,' only another court of the
state." Under Swift v. Tyson, this was true insofar as the application
of state statutes bearing upon substantive rights and decisions relating
to regulation of local property was concerned. 20  Under Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins a federal court is "in effect" a state court insofar as the
application of all state law, statutory and decisional, of a substantive
character is concerned. Thus, the rule was not changed by the Eric
case; it merely extended it to cases where state decisional law was in
issue rather than where state statutory law was involved. Guaranty
Trust Co. . York2 ' held specifically that state statutes of limitation,
although traditionally regarded as affecting the remedy but not the
right, must be followed by the federal courts because they significantly
affect the outcome of litigation. The Bullington case holds specifically
that state statutes which deprive the state courts of jurisdiction, if con-
stitutional,2 2 must be followed by the federal courts. Neither the York
case nor the Bullington case announced a new rule when it was said
that in diversity cases federal courts are courts of the state in which
they sit. They represent an extension of the rule so that today federal
courts are courts of the state in which they sit so far as the application
of state laws which significantly affect the outcome of litigation is con-
cerned, regardless of the traditional characterization of those laws.
It has been settled law that a state court's interpretation of state
statutes is binding upon the federal courts. What effect does the
" Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939).
" Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
" Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941).
"6 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
Long v. Morris, 128 F. 2d 653 (C. C. A. 3d 1942).
'
8 Also included are state rule as to proving contributory negligence, Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943); state statute making statutes of limitations
applicable to both law, and equity, Kithcart v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 150 F. 2d 997
(C. C. A. 8th 1945) ; state rule as to forum non conveniens, Weiss v. Routh, 149
F. 2d 193 (C. C. A. 2d 1945). But cf. Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326
U. S. 549 (1945) (forum non conveniens question left open).
- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 659, 91 L. Ed. 557, 559 (1947).
20 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 171 (1929); Bucher v.
Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555 (1887) ; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369
(1877) (federal courts are courts of the state to the extent that a state statute
plus consent of parties may create circumstances which will authorize a federal
court to take jurisdiction).21326 U. S. 99 (1945).
2 See discussion of constitutionality of statute in Note, 24 N. C. L. Rzv. 267
(1946).
"Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306 (1926) ; Kansas City Steel Co. v. Arkansas,
269 U. S. 148 (1925) ; Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U. S. 30 (1923); Quong
Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Comm., 255 U, S. 445.(1920) ; Old Colony Trust Co.
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principal case have upon that rule? To be binding upon federal courts,.
the interpretation placed by a state court upon its statutes must comport
with the constitution. 24 In the Bullington case, the constitutionality of
the statute was attacked and necessarily decided by the state court 2 5 If
the statute were unconstitutional, the North Carolina court was not at
liberty to apply it, and the federal court not at liberty to follow it.2 6
A state cannot escape its constitutional obligations by withholding juris-
diction from its courts.2 7  But, legislative acts are presumed to be con-
stitutional until constitutionality is determined. 28
Since the issue of constitutionality was necessarily decided below
and is res judicata unless appealed, and a presumption of constitution-
ality obtains until a decision on the merits is rendered, bearing in mind
the state court characterized the statute as procedural, it would seem
to follow from a cursory reading of the opinion that the Bullington case
rejects the rule that the state court's interpretation is binding. But, it
must be remembered that in diversity cases federal courts must concern
themselves with uniformity within the state. The court in the instant
case has held iot that the state court's interpretation is- no longer bind-
ing but that the effect of the decision is controlling. For purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, in view of the York case, the interpretation of
state statutes by state courts is material only insofar as it effects the out-
come of litigation. It would defeat the policy of the Erie case to hold
that the literal interpretation of a state statute is binding upon the federal
courts but the effect thereof is not.
One important effect of the Bullington decision is a change in the
rule that a state cannot by legislation enlarge or diminish federal juris-
diction.29 The practical effect of the decision is without doubt a limita-
v. Omaha, 230 U. S. 100 (1912); American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47(1910) ; Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555 (1887) ; Louisiana v. Pills-
bury, 105 U. S. 278 (1881) ; Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196, 203 (U. S. 1866) ;
Gelpke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1863) ; Commercial Bank v. Buckingham, 5 How.
317 (U. S. 1846); Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152, 159 (U. S. 1825) ("This
court has uniformly professed its disposition, in cases depending upon the laws of a
particular state, to adopt the construction which the courts of the state have given
to those laws. This course is founded upon the principle, supposed to be uni-
versally recognized, that the judicial department of every government . . . is the
appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government ...
The construction given by the courts of the several states to the legislative acts
of those states, is received as true, unless they come in conflict with the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
"Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1934) ; Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper,
286 U. S. 145 (1931) ; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152 (U. S. 1825); Mills
v. Duryee, 7 Cranch. 481 (U. S. 1813) ; accord, Home Ins. Co. v. Dik, 281 U. S.
397, 407 (1929).
- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 660, 91 L. Ed. 557, 560 (1947).
.- See cases cited supra note 24.
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1934) ; accord, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U. S. 397, 407 (1929).1111 Amt. JuR., CoNs rutioNAL LAw, §92.
2David Lupton's Sons v. Auto. Club of America, 225 U. S. 489 (1911);
Traction Co. v. Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239 (1904) ; Chicot County v. Sherwood,
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tion on federal diversity jurisdiction resulting from a state statute. The
court recognized this fact when it termed David Lupton's Sons v. Auto.
Club of Americas° obsolete.31 That case held that a state statute reg-
ulating the right of foreign corporations to sue in the state courts was
not binding upon federal courts within that state. The emphasis since
the Erie case being upon the policy of uniformity of result, it would
seem to follow that any state statute significantly affecting the result of
litigation would be followed by the federal courts regardless of the
purpose which the statute was enacted to accomplish.3 2 This conclusion
is strengthened by the fact that the Lupton case was expressly termed
obsolete. The statute considered in the Lupton case did not bar access
to the state courts under any and all circumstances; it merely prescribed
conditions precedent to the privilege of using the state courts.33 There
was no inherent want of jurisdiction. The statute involved in the instant
case, however, rendered it absolutely impossible to sue in the state courts
for a deficiency arising out of a purchase money mortgage. There is
an inherent want of jurisdiction. Thus, there is a distinction between
the two types of statutes. This distinction could have been pointed
out, and the Lupton case allowed to stand on the theory that the privi-
lege of invoking the aid of the federal courts need not be subject to
the qualifications placed on the privilege by a state. By terming the
Lupton case obsolete, the court made it reasonably clear that it was more
concerned with uniformity of result than with the reasons which moti-
vate a state legislature in enacting such a statute.3 4 If this reasoning is
correct, it follows that the rule that a state cannot by legislation affect
federal diversity jurisdiction is no longer law. At least as between the
parties to the state litigation, the state statute has limited the power of
the federal courts to grant relief.3 5
148 U. S. 529, 534 (1892) ; Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 13 Wall. 270 (U. S.
1871); Union Bank v. Jolly's Adm'rs, 18 How. 503 (U. S. 1855); Suydam v.
Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67 (U. S. 1840).
30225 U. S. 489 (1911).
- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 662, 91 L. Ed. 557, 562 (1947).
"A different attitude is expressed in Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1037, 1040 (1947).
"225 U. S. 489, 495 (1911).
"The purpose for which the statute in the instant case was enacted is not
stated by the North Carolina court. Conceivably, it could have been enacted to
relieve court dockets.
" Could the federal court grant relief as between persons not parties to the
state litigation? Assume a case brought in the federal court in the first instance
which -would be barred by the statute if brought in the state court. Res judicata
would not apply, would the Erie rule? That question is foreclosed by the decision
in the instant case. Federal courts, to effect the policy of uniformity, are obliged
to follow state statutes which deprive the state courts of jurisdiction of a par-
ticular cause of action, even though the application of such statute results in a
limitation of federal diversity jurisdiction. This rule, applies, however, if the
state statute does not contravene the federal Constitution. (See p. 68 infra). A
determination of the constitutionality of the state statute would be necessary. Had
the state court upheld the federal constitutionality in a prior suit between different
parties, such a ruling would not bind the" federal courts. Federal courts are not
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The court might, however, have reasoned that the Rules of Decision
Act" has always required an application by federal courts of state
statutes affecting substantive rights. Under Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, this statute affects substantive rights because it significantly
affects the outcome of litigation. Consequently, this is not a case of a
state by legislation affecting diversity jurisdiction, but is a case of Con-
gress regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This is a theo-
retical approach inconsistent with reality because in the absence of the
state statute, federal jurisdiction in this case would be unchanged. The
state statute determined whether the federal court had jurisdiction.8 7
Res judicata is a general classification which may be subdivided into
two more specific classifications: estoppel by judgment and estoppel by
verdict.38 Estoppel by judgment arises where the second action is be-
tween the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action. 9
Estoppel by verdict arises when the second suit is upon a different cause
of action but involves issues which have been raised and decided in a
prior suit between the same parties or their privies.4 0 Estoppel by
judgment concludes the parties as to all matters put in issue and all
those which could have been put in issue while estoppel by verdict con-
cludes the parties only as to matters actually decided.41
bound by state decisions construing the federal Constitution. Kansas City Steel
Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U. S. 148 (1896); Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S.
112 (1925); Williams v. Arlington Hotel Co., 15 F. 2d 412 (E. D. Ark. 1926);
Eastern Gulf Oil Co. v. Kentucky Tax Comm., 17 F. 2d 394 (E. D. Ky. 1926);
Orr v. Allen, 245 Fed. 486 (S. D. Ohio 1917). If the statute were held constitu-
tional, the Erie rule would apply and uniformity would be effected. If the statute
were held unconstitutional, the Erie rule would not apply and relief would be
granted. The policy of uniformity would still be accomplished, however, since the
state courts could no longer deny relief on the basis of an unconstitutional statute.
" REv. STAT. §721 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §725 (1940).
" Assuming the state statute is constitutional, this reasoning might be used to
countervail the argument that an application of the Erie rule to a state statute
which results in a limitation of diversity jurisdiction, is itself unconstitutional.
Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
8 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876) ; A. B. C. Truck Lines v.
Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So. 2d 511 (1946) ; Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672, 38
S. E. 2d 394 (1946) (res judicata relates only to suits on same cause of action;
estoppel by judgment applies where causes are different. This is merely confusion
of terminology) ; Elmhurst v. Kegerreis, 392 Ill. 195, 64 N. E. 2d 450 (1946);
McKimmnon v. Calk, 170 N. C. 54, 86 S. E. 809 (1915) ; McTeer Clothing Co. v.
Hay, 163 N. C. 495, 79 S. E. 955 (1913) ; Weston v. Roper Lumber Co., 162 N. C.
165, 178, 77 S. E. 430 (1913); Brown v. Wheeling & L. E. R. R. Co., 77 Ohio
App; 149, 65 N. E. 2d 912 (1946).
A. B. C. Truck Lines v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So. 2d 511 (1946);
Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672, 38 S. E. 2d 349 (1946) ; Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 45
A. 2d 218 (N. H. 1946); Pollock-v. Bowman, 139 N. J. Eq. 47 (Ct. Err. & App.,
1946), 49 A. 2d 40; Milltown v. New Brunswick, 138 N. J. Eq. 552 (Ch. 1946),
49 A. 2d 234; Moore v. Harkins, 179 N. C. 167, 101 S. E. 564 (1919) ; Tuttle v.
Harrill, 85 N. C. 456 (1881).
"0 Oklahoma ex rel. Comm'rs v. United States, 155 F. 2d 486 (C. C. A. 10th
1946) ; Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672, 38 S. E. 2d 394 (1946); Elmhurst v.
Kegerreis, 392 Ill. 195, 64 N. E. 2d 450 (1946); Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 45 A. 2d
218 (N. H. 1946) ; Coltrane v. Laughlin, 157 N. C. 282, 72 S. E. 961 (1911).
Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726, 735 (1946); Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry-
1947]
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To say that "for purposes of res judicata, the significance of what a
court says it decides is controlled by the issues that were open for
decision,"4 2 is hardly more than saying that the prior suit concludes the
parties as to all matters which could have been put in issue. And that
is an established rule where estoppel by judgment is applied. In the
instant case, the parties are identical and the cause of action is a "carbon
copy" of the action in the state court.
Since estoppel by judgment concludes the parties not only with re-
spect to the issues actually raised and decided but also as to all matters
which could have been put in issue, it cannot be said that the former
judgment or decision is the criterion for applying the doctrine.43  It
cannot always be ascertained from a judgment or decision just what
were the questions presented for decision or raised in the case, nor what
might have been raised. Accordingly, it is held that the whole record
may be searched to determine what was decided.44  Also, that parol
evidence is admissible to ascertain what was decided, i.e., the scope of
the judgment.45  the effect of a decision may result in concluding an
issue although the decision does not on its face purport to do so.4 3 "The
value of a plea of former adjudication is not to be determined by the
reasons which the court rendering the former judgment may have given
for doing so."4 7  The result of the decision is material. Thus, estoppel
by judgment settles all questions which were raised or those that might
have been raised but it settles them in accordance with the entire record
and the effect of the decision. The effect of the North Carolina court's
decision was that the statute was constitutional.
The difficulty in applying res judicata to the Bullington case lies in
dock & Repair, 66 Sup. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1946) ; Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1939) ; Oklahoma ex rel. Comm'rs v. United States,
155 F. 2d 486 (C. C. A. 10th 1946) ; In re Mercury Engineering, Inc., 68 F. Sup.(S. D. Cal. 1946) ; Buchanan v. Gen. Motors, 64 F. Supp. 16 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) ;Drittel v. Freedman, 60- F. Supp. 999 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd 154 F. 2d 653(C. C. A. 2d 1946); Jefferson County v. McAdory, 25 So. 2d 396 (Ala. 1946);Olwell v. Hopkins, 168 P. 2d 972 (Cal. 1946) ; Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672,38 S. E. 2d 394 (1946); People v. Thompson, 392 Ill. 589, 65 N. E. 2d 362(1946); Hays v. Sturgill, 302 Ky. 31, 193 S. W. 2d 648 (1946); Sou. Dist.
Co. v. Carraway, 196 N. C. 58, 144 S. E. 535 (1928); Moore v. Harkins, 179
N. C. 167, 101 S. E. 564 (1919) ; Stelges v. Simmons, 170 N. C. 42, 86 S. E. 564(1919); Tuttle v. Harrill, 85 N. C. 456 (1881); Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 45 A. 2d218 (N. H. 1946); Pollock y. Bowman, 139 N. f. Eq. 47 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946)
49 A. 2d 40; Jones v. Costlow, 354 Pa. 245, 47 A. 2d 259 (1946).
2 U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 660, 91 L. Ed. 557, 560 (1947).
See Justice Rutledge's dissent, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 669 (1947).
"Drittel v. Freedman, 60 F. Supp. 999 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd, 154 F. 2d
653 (C. C. A. 2d 1946) ; Olwell v. Hopkins, 168 P. 2d 972 (Cal. 1946) ; 2 FaRa-
MANr, JUDGMENTS §725 (5th ed. 1925).
' Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876); Southerland v. A. C. L.
R. R., 148 N. C. 442, 62 S. E. 517 (1908).
,' Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1939) ; Olwell
v. Hopkins, 168 P. 2d 972 (Cal. 1946); Elmhurst v. Kegerreis, 392 Ill. 195, 64
N. E. 2d 450 (1946).
" Elmhurst v. Kegerreis, 392 Ill. 195, 64 N. E. 2d 450 (1946).
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the fact that the doctrine has no application where the former decision
was not on the "merits." Is a dismissal for want of jurisdiction a
decision on the "merits"? Ordinarily not. Judgments based upon tech-
nicality such as defect of pleading, matters in abatement, nonsuits; dis-
missals and the like are not on the merits. 48  No substantial rights are
affected. But, in such cases, the effect ordinarily is not to preclude a
litigant from maintaining his action altogether. There is no inherent
defect of jurisdiction. The decision merely tells him he is in the wrong
court of the forum and should seek his relief in another court of the
forum, or cure the technical defect and start over.49  That did not
happen in the case under discussion. Bullington was told he could'not
maintain his action in any court of the state. There was an inherent
defect of jurisdiction. The "merits" of his action were twofold-the
right to maintain this action and the right to prove the deficiency. He
questioned the constitutionality of the statute denying him the right to
maintain his action. The North Carolina decision in effect held the
statute constitutional. That which was res fudicata was the constitu-
tional issue, not whether the state court had jurisdiction.
Tile question remains, why was it necessary to apply both the Erie
rule and res judicata to reach the result desired? Would not either one
have accomplished that end? Assume first that the action arose before
the Erie case, and res judicata was not applied. The result would be
clear. The federal court would have granted relief because (1) the
policy under Swift v. Tyson was uniformity within the federal court
system, (2) the federal courts were not bound to follow state statutes
construed by the state courts as procedural. No constitutional issue
would be involved.,
Assume secondly that the Erie rule is in effect; the case comes be-
fore the United States Supreme Court. It holds that the policy of Erie
requires the federal courts in diversity cases to reach the same result
that would be reached in the state courts. The lower courts are re-
versed. The question immediately arises, may the Erie rule be so
applied as to require a federal court to follow a state court decision
upholding the constitutionality of a state statute if in fact the statute is
deemed by the federal court to violate the United States Constitution?
Thus, under an application of the Erie rule alone, a constitutional issue50
arises which would not arise under our first assumption above. Federal
courts are not obliged to follow state court decisions construing the
,8 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §733 (5th ed. 1925).
,"'Smith v. McNeal, 109 U. S. 426 (1883) ; Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall.
232, 237 (U. S. 1866); Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 156, 161 (U. S. 1840); Johnson
v. Whilden, 166 N. C. 104, 81 S. E. 1057 (1914); Dalton v. Webster, 82 N. C.
279 (1880).
'An application of the Erie rule by the federal courts to an unconstitutional
state statute would itself be unconstitutional. See cases cited supra note 24.
1947]
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federal Contsitution.51 For the purpose of ruling on state statutes
alleged to be in violation of the federal Constitution, the federal courts
are independent of the state courts. Since the obligations imposed by
the United States Constitution extend to all courts, state and federal, a
state statute alleged to be in violation of the federal Constitution could
not be followed by the federal courts in the absence of a ruling on its
constitutionality by those courts. Thus, a disposition of the constitu-
tional issue is necessary before the Erie rule can be applied.52
Assume thirdly that the United States Supreme Court had decided
the case solely on the basis of res judicata and did not invoke the Erie
doctrine. The lower federal courts would have been affirmed for the
following reasons: (1) The constitutionality of the statute being res
judicata it could not be attacked in the federal court; (2) the decision
of the North Carolina Supreme Court that the statute was purely pro-
cedural and did not affect the substantive rights of the parties likewise
was res judicata, and hence any claim that the statute was other than
procedural could not be raised in the federal court; and finally, (3) since
the constitutionality of the statute could not be ittacked and since as
between the parties to the litigation it must be deemed to have no effect
on their substantive rights, the federal court must now pass upon those
rights without hindrance of the state statute which has already been
held merely to bar the state courts from giving the relief sought. Bul-
lington, therefore, had res judicata alone been applied, would have ob-
tained in the federal court what he was denied in the state court. The
result would have been the same as under Swift v. Tyson. The policy
of uniformity within the boundaries of the state would have been
defeatedP.
And so we see that without the use of either res judicata or the Erie
doctrine the federal court could have granted relief denied by the state
court. We also see that the use of the Erie doctrine alone does not
require the federal court to follow a state court ruling upholding the
constitutionality of a state statute if in fact it contravenes the federal
Constitution. And lastly we see that an application of res judicata alone
""Where the questions inv6lved arise under the state constitution and laws,
the decisions of its highest tribunal are accepted as controlling. Where the Con-
stitution or laws of .the United States are drawn into question, the courts of the
United State must determine the controversy for themselves." Fuller, C. J., In re
Tyler, 149 U. S. 164 (1892). See discussion and cases cited sutpra note 35.
"Furthermore, had the Erie rule alone been applied, it is possible that the
decision would have been accepted as an inferential determination of the con-
stitutionality of the North Carolina statute. Indeed, that is the very manner in
which the United States Supreme Court regarded the North Carolina decision.
" Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945) ("The nub of the policy
that underlies Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkinm is that for the same transaction the
accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a
state court a block away, should not lead to a substantially different result.").
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would have required the federal court to grant relief on the substantive
issue not determined in the state court.
Now let us do as Justice Frankfurter did and combine res judicata
and the Erie doctrine. What is the result? By the use of res judicata
the constitutionality of the state statute as between the parties is settled.
It cannot be attacked in the federal court. By the use of the Erie doc-
trine the state policy of denying relief is to be followed if the state
statute establishing such policy is constitutional. But the constitution-
ality question having been determined by the application of res judicata
there is now no problem. The state policy enunciated by a "constitu-
tional" statute is now applied in the federal court.
Hence, we see that the desired end of not allowing Bullington a
recovery in a federal court when he was denied the same in a state
court is attained only by utilizing both the doctrines of the Erie case
and res judicata.
CLAUDE F. SEILA.
Declaratory Judgment-Trustees' Request for Instructions
The Elders of the First Presbyterian Church of Salisbury as the
trustees under a will probated in 1849, devising a certain plot of land
in Salisbury together with the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)
in trust for the church, came into the Superior Court of Rowan County
under the declaratory judgment act," asking for a declaration that they
had the power "to sell, mortgage, and/or lease" the property in view of
changed conditions. The trust instrument specifically withheld the power
of sale, and provided that if the trustees should fail or neglect to execute
the trust, then the property should go to Davidson College. The trustees
were to keep the property so improved that the rent would provide a
revenue for the church. Plaintiffs alleged the property was on the edge
of the business district in Salisbury and very much in demand by com-
mercial interests, but that they were financially unable to develop and
maintain it adequately. Trial court granted the relief requested. Held:
Reversed and case dismissed. Declaratory judgment inappropriate:
(1) plaintiff should have brought trustees' bill in equity for instructions,
(2) apparently the court felt that the request for tle power of sale
would have invoked a forfeiture of the estate.
2
It is surprising to find the court refusing a declaratory judgment on
the first ground, for the declaratory action is an outgrowth.and extension
of the trustees' bill in equity for instructions.3 Thus the court indicates
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§1-253 et seq.
Brandis et al. v. Trustees of Davidson College et al., 227 N. C. 329, 41 S. E.
2d 833 (1947).
'Little v. Thorne, 93 N. C. 69 (1885) (under the equity jurisdiction of the
court, by a trustee's request for instructions, an executor or trustee may apply to
19471
